

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

OCI No. 2957/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
20 December 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Reintegration of Insurgents Into National Life

INTRODUCTION

1. We have examined the experience of Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in the reintegration of insurgents into national life following the suppression of insurgency. Information available shows a wide variety of approaches. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Philippine Government undertook a major program of rehabilitation and attempted to alleviate conditions which gave rise to insurgency; and the Greek governments combined large-scale release and resettlement programs with a continuing anti-Communist legal and propaganda campaign. In Malaya, because of the ethnic nature of the insurgency, the authorities directed their attention largely to the entire Chinese community.

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
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### THE PHILIPPINES

9. Ramon Magsaysay, first as Defense Minister and later as President, was the principal architect of the program for rehabilitating supporters of the Huk insurrection, which at its peak in 1950 numbered about 18,000 men under arms, as well as approximately 100,000 sympathizers. His earliest and best known rehabilitation program was inaugurated in 1950, shortly after he became Defense Minister. An economic Development Corps, staffed and administered by the armed forces, was established to resettle Huks and their families. Some 400 families from populous central Luzon were settled in supervised homestead farms in northeastern Luzon and Mindanao. The program was largely terminated after five years as the Huk movement withered in the face of military action and steps to undercut sympathy for them among the peasantry.

10. In 1954, as part of the more general effort to win over the peasantry, Magsaysay, now President, established the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Agency to facilitate the redistribution of some of the over 25 million acres of public lands to tenants, and to encourage migration to sparsely settled areas. Other legislation was passed in an effort to break up many of the large landholdings and transfer ownership to the peasantry, but loopholes limited its effect. Magsaysay also expanded rural credit facilities and encouraged agricultural cooperatives. In 1956 an ambitious community development program was instituted to eliminate the root causes of poverty and to improve and enrich rural life.

11. By the time of Magsaysay's death in 1957, the Huk movement had virtually disappeared. Today it remains an ineffective, fragmented organization restricted largely to central Luzon, with an estimated membership of only 100-150 armed insurgents and approximately 5,000 sympathizers.

GREECE

12. The Greek experience deals with two groups of veterans of the guerrilla war which ended in 1949: those returned from exile in Communist eastern Europe, and those released from prison and detention camps. Over the years the Greek governments combined a policy of gradual repatriation and rehabilitation with strict prohibition on Communist activities as such.

13. When the fighting ended, about 21,000 persons were held in prisons and camps. By the time the Karamanlis government came to power in 1955, all but about 3,800 "political" prisoners had been released; two years ago when George Papandreou became Premier the number was down to 980, and by the latest report early this year only 88 persons convicted of "heinous" crimes connected with the insurrection remained in prison. As the prisoners were released they were allowed to reenter their family and village groups, their activities being circumscribed mainly by emergency measures dating back to the peak of the guerrilla war which banned the Communist Party and sought to suppress other Communist activities. Many of them joined the United Democratic Left party organized in 1951, which now is regarded as the overt political arm of the Greek Communist movement. Many who were among the top Communist leaders during the civil war are today in the top echelons of EDA. Others have become active in the EDA-sponsored youth movement, and in trade union affairs.

14. Of an estimated 50-100,000 persons who fled with the guerrillas into neighboring Communist countries, about 13,000 have been repatriated to date. Most of them were peasants and workers from Greece's northern border areas, and available evidence indicates that those who returned have settled into their former homes in the villages and on the farms. Many sought repatriation because of their disillusionment over living conditions in the exile community under the Communist regime. There is no firm evidence that the returnees as a group cause any particular trouble for the government or receive any official aid in their resettlement.

15. Under the Karamanlis administration, despite the continuing release and repatriation program, many

government activities were specifically aimed at preventing the increase of Communist participation in national life. The armed forces and security services engaged in anti-Communist educational and propaganda programs and exerted considerable pressures on left wing elements in order to curb their activities. A "service of national enlightenment" attempted to portray the true nature of Communism. The Papandreou government took a considerably more permissive attitude during its first year in office, but before it fell had taken steps to tighten controls on Communist activity.

16. In general, few of those repatriated or released from prison apparently still adhere to their earlier devotion to Communism in the face of continuous pressure from the government and a conservative society. Those who were long removed from Greek life find it difficult to readjust to current issues, and few wish to jeopardize their resettlement by active participation in party affairs.

#### MALAYA

17. British success against the military insurgency waged by the Malayan Communist party began in 1950 with the abandonment of collective punishment of villages and repatriation of suspects to China in favor of more imaginative policies. Rural Chinese, on whom the insurgent organization depended, were resettled into controlled "new villages" where they could be kept under surveillance and provided protection. Several rehabilitation camps were established to indoctrinate Chinese known to have aided the insurgents.

18. By 1955, largely because of the resettlement scheme's success, the insurgents sought in vain to negotiate an end to the fighting. In 1960, following further attrition of the Communists, the government declared the insurrection ended. Throughout this period government efforts were directed less at rehabilitating groups of insurgents as such than at giving the entire Chinese community a feeling of identification with Malaya. Britain's extensive psychological warfare campaign against disloyal and potentially disloyal Chinese was always

subordinate to attempts to control them physically. Like other overseas Chinese communities in southeast Asia, the Chinese in Malaya still are not completely integrated into Malayan life and their future loyalty remains somewhat suspect. An extensive propaganda campaign was designed to foster within the Chinese population a sense of national identity with the new self-governing Malayan state. Surrendered insurgents spoke to assembled villages of their disillusionment with Communism and the insurrection. The British inspired the creation of the Malayan Chinese Association and assisted the formation of other non-Communist Chinese political organizations.

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COMPLETED AS OCI No. 2957/65 DATED 20 DECEMBER 1965  
OCI - NOTICE OF SPECIAL PAPER

No. 437-65 Date \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT Reintegration of Insurgents Into National Life  
STATINTL (Greece, Malaya, Philippines, etc.)

REQUESTED BY [REDACTED] --DDI--RL

PURPOSE : \_\_\_\_\_

DESIRED LENGTH : 25 COPIES PRINTED

SPECIAL DISSEM 1-6 Fws to O/DDI for Ropa (White House) (see/enter below)  
7-15 [REDACTED] GRAPHICS?

COORDINATION 16-20 - AA [REDACTED] STATINTL  
OUTSIDE OCI 21-22 - OAD/CI STATINTL  
23-24 - MCO

ASSIGNED TO : [REDACTED] DUE DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

OAD REVIEW : STATINTL

1. O/DCI \_\_\_\_\_ 4. CS/II \_\_\_\_\_ 6. WA \_\_\_\_\_ 7. AA \_\_\_\_\_ 8. SSBA \_\_\_\_\_  
2. O/DDI \_\_\_\_\_ 5. DAY/SIDO \_\_\_\_\_ P/A \_\_\_\_\_ P/A \_\_\_\_\_ P/A \_\_\_\_\_  
3. O/ADCI \_\_\_\_\_

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20 December 1965

Mr. Donald Ropa  
NSC Staff  
Executive Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Don:

Attached in response to your request is a review of the experience of Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, [REDACTED] in reintegrating insurgents into the national community. We are not making any other dissemination.

[REDACTED]  
Assistant to the  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment  
OCI No. 2957/65

cc: DDCI through Executive Director

O/DDI: [REDACTED]:sfc


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